Seder ha-teshuvah -- Marpe la-nefesh -- Teshuvah me-ḥayim.

The daring idea that convention - human decision - lies at the root both of necessary truths and much of empirical science reverberates through twentieth-century philosophy, constituting a revolution comparable to Kant's Copernican revolution. This book provides a comprehensive study of Conventionalism. Drawing a distinction between two conventionalist theses, the under-determination of science by empirical fact, and the linguistic account of necessity, Yemima Ben-Menahem traces the evolution of both ideas to their origins in Poincaré's geometric conventionalism. She argues that (...) the radical extrapolations of Poincaré's ideas by later thinkers, including Wittgenstein, Quine, and Carnap, eventually led to the decline of conventionalism. This book provides a fresh perspective on twentieth-century philosophy. Many of the major themes of contemporary philosophy emerge in this book as arising from engagement with the challenge of conventionalism. (shrink)

This paper examines Quine’s web of belief metaphor and its role in his various responses to conventionalism. Distinguishing between two versions of conventionalism, one based on the under-determination of theory, the other associated with a linguistic account of necessary truth, I show how Quine plays the two versions of conventionalism against each other. Some of Quine’s reservations about conventionalism are traced back to his 1934 lectures on Carnap. Although these lectures appear to endorse Carnap’s conventionalism, in exposing Carnap’s failure to (...) provide an explanatory account of analytic truth, they in fact anticipate Quine’s later critique of conventionalism. I further argue that Quine eventually deconstructs both his own metaphor and the thesis of under-determination it serves to illustrate. This enables him to hold onto under-determination, but at the cost of depleting it of any real epistemic significance. Lastly, I explore the implications of this deconstruction for Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis. (shrink)

According to the current epistemic interpretation of quantum probabilities, the quantum correlations manifesting nonlocality can be derived from purely probabilistic and information-theoretic constraints. As such, they do not constitute a spacetime phenomenon and cannot lead to conflict between QM and any spatial-temporal constraints. This paper compares recent epistemic interpretations with earlier probabilistic interpretations, noting their merits as well as the difficulties they encounter. In particular, the implications of the recent PBR theorem are examined. While generally seen as undermining the epistemic (...) interpretation, I argue that the PBR theorem actually suggests an epistemic position more radical than previously ones. This review of probabilistic interpretations enables reassessment of the epistemic theorist's attempt to disentangle nonlocality from spacetime considerations. (shrink)

The ArgumentIdealizations and approximations are an indispensable tool for the scientist. This paper argues that idealizations and approximations are equally indispensable for the philosopher of science. In particular, it is shown that the deductive model of scientific theories is an idealization in precisely the same sense that frictionless motion is an idealization in mechanics. By its very nature, an idealization cannot be criticized as not being absolutely true to the facts, for it need not be. Thus, the usual type of (...) criticism levelled against the deductive model is shown to be irrelevant. The main step in the argument consists in using a logic of approximation to clarify the notions of approximate implication and approximate entailment, which are usually rejected as hopelessly vague. More generally, the conception underlying the paper is that the desiderata of science should be formulated in such a way that complying with them could be a matter of degree, and that pragmatic considerations could be taken into account. This conception is motivated by the wish to introduce some quantitative concepts in the philosophy of science, thereby bringing the philosopher's perspective closer to that of the scientist. (shrink)

This paper construes various positions in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of law as responses to the problem of underdetermination in science and in law. We begin by drawing a close analogy between the successive approaches to this problem in the two fields. In particular, we stress the analogy between conventionalism as a philosophy of science and legal realism as a philosophy of law, and between Putnam's and Dworkin's critiques of these positions. We then challenge the Putnam-Dworkin strategy, (...) arguing that their attempts to combat underdetermination are unsuccessful. We are thus led to scepticism regarding the outlook underlying the celebrated maxim, “ruled by law, not by men”. (shrink)

The paper provides a new characterization of the concepts of necessity and contingency as they should be used in the historical context. The idea is that contingency (necessity) increases in direct (reverse) proportion to sensitivity to initial conditions. The merits of this suggestion are that it avoids the conflation of causality and necessity (or contingency and chance), that it enables the bracketing of the problem of free will while maintaining the concept of human action making a difference, that it sanctions (...) tendencies without recourse to teleology, and that it recasts the controversy between historicists and anti‐historicists in less dogmatic language. (shrink)

Emch, G.G., Liu, C.: The Logic of Thermostatistical Physics. Springer, Berlin/ Heidelberg (2002) 11. Frigg, R., Werndl, C.: Entropy – a guide for the perplexed. Forthcoming in: Beisbart, C., Hartmann, S. (eds.) Probabilities in Physics. Oxford  ...

This book explores the role of causal constraints in science, shifting our attention from causal relations between individual events--the focus of most philosophical treatments of causation--to a broad family of concepts and principles generating constraints on possible change. Yemima Ben-Menahem looks at determinism, locality, stability, symmetry principles, conservation laws, and the principle of least action-causal constraints that serve to distinguish events and processes that our best scientific theories mandate or allow from those they rule out. Ben-Menahem's approach reveals (...) that causation is just as relevant to explaining why certain events fail to occur as it is to explaining events that do occur. She investigates the conceptual differences between, and interrelations of, members of the causal family, thereby clarifying problems at the heart of the philosophy of science. Ben-Menahem argues that the distinction between determinism and stability is pertinent to the philosophy of history and the foundations of statistical mechanics, and that the interplay of determinism and locality is crucial for understanding quantum mechanics. Providing historical perspective, she traces the causal constraints of contemporary science to traditional intuitions about causation, and demonstrates how the teleological appearance of some constraints is explained away in current scientific theories such as quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This paper deals with the dependence of directionality in the course of events-or our claims concerning such directionality-on the modes of description we use in speaking of the events in question. I argue that criteria of similarity and individuation play a crucial role in assessments of directionality. This is an extension of Davidson's claim regarding the difference between causal and explanatory contexts. The argument is based on a characterisation of notions of necessity and contingency that differ from their modal logic (...) counterparts on the one hand, and from causality and chance on the other. I show that some types of directionality are perfectly compatible with both determinism and indeterminism at the microscopic level, and that there is no likelihood of, or advantage to, reducing such directionality to other laws or causal processes. (shrink)

The ArgumentEinstein's concept of causality as analyzed in this paper is a thick concept comprised of: (a) regularity; (b) locality; (c) symmetry considerations leading to conservation laws; (d) mutuality of causal interaction. The main theses are: 1. Since (b)–(d) are not elements of Hume's concept of causality, Einstein's concept, the concept embedded in the theory of relativity, is manifestly non–Humean. 2. On a Humean conception, Newtonian mechanics is a paradigmatically causal theory. Einstein, however, regarded this theory as causally deficient, for (...) it fails to comply with both (b) and (d). Special relativity was (partly) motivated by the wish to correct the first of these failures; general relativity the second. 3. Ironically, general relativity, based on the thick concept of causality, opens the way for a conventionalist understanding of that concept. 4. With regard to human freedom, Einstein professed to be a Spinozist. However, he suggested a version of soft determinism, not found in Spinoza. (shrink)

According to Mark Steiner, Wittgenstein’s intense work in the philosophy of mathematics during the early 1930s brought about a distinct turning point in his philosophy. The crux of this transition, Steiner contends, is that Wittgenstein came to see mathematical truths as originating in empirical regularities that in the course of time have been hardened into rules. This interpretation, which construes Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mathematics as more realist than his earlier philosophy, challenges another influential interpretation which reads Wittgenstein as moving (...) in the opposite direction, from a more realist toward a less realist position. Both of these readings, I argue here, tend to overlook the crucial role of conventionalism in shaping Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. I show that during the transition period, Wittgenstein was first strongly attracted to conventionalism, but then, upon discovery of the rule following paradox, came to realize its weaknesses. Did this realization mark the end of the liaison with conventionalism and a wholehearted acceptance of the empirical regularities account? Illustrating Wittgenstein’s ongoing ambivalence toward conventionalism and pointing to his novel understanding of this position, I answer this question in the negative. (shrink)

Abstract The paper argues that James's conception of truth is non?revisionist, that is, it sanctions common use of the notion of truth, but criticizes foundation?alist philosophical accounts of that notion. This interpretation conflicts with traditional interpretations of James such as Russell's and Moore's, and contemporary interpretations such as Dummett's, all of which are revisionist. To the extent that objections raised against James's pragmatism depend on such revisionist reading, this paper constitutes a defence of James. The paper argues, further, that non?revisionism (...) distinguishes James from logical positivism and contemporary verificationism, and that James seeks to defend rather than renounce metaphysics. On this issue the paper disagrees with Rorty, who ascribes to James an extreme anti?metaphysical stance. (shrink)

In a situation in which several explanations compete, is the one that is better qua explanation also the one we should regard as the more likely to be true? Realists usually answer in the affirmative. They then go on to argue that since realism provides the best explanation for the success of science, realism can be inferred to. Nonrealists, on the other hand, answer the above question in the negative, thereby renouncing the inference to realism. In this paper I separate (...) the two issues. In the first section it is argued that a rationale can be provided for the inference to the best explanation; in the second, that this rationale cannot justify an inference to realism. The defence of the inference rests on the claim that our standards of explanatory power are subject to critical examination, which, in turn, should be informed by empirical considerations. By means of a comparison of the realist's explanation for the success of science with that of conventionalism and instrumentalism it is then shown that realism does not offer a superior explanation and should not, therefore, be inferred to. (shrink)

1. [without special title] -- ḥeleḳ 2. Meḳorot u-ferushim.

Poincaré’s conventionalism has thoroughly transformed both the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mathematics. Not only proponents of conventionalism, such as the logical positivists, were influenced by Poincaré, but also outspoken critics of conventionalism, such as Quine and Putnam, were inspired by his daring position. Indeed, during the twentieth century, most philosophers of mathematics and of science engaged in dialogue with conventionalism. As is often the case with such complex clusters of ideas, there is no consensus about the meaning (...) of conventionalism in general, and Poincaré’s original version of it, in particular. Nonetheless, notions such as the under-determination, empirical equivalence, implicit definition, holism and conceptual relativity, all of which can be linked to Poincare's writings have become central to philosophy. This essay explores the impact of some of these notions on twentieth century philosophy of science. In addition to inspiration based on Poincare's actual views, it emphasizes directions based on misreading and unjustified appropriations of Poincaré. (shrink)

Ḥeleḳ Rishon, kerekh 1. Teshuvot ha-shayakhot le-Miḳra Midrash ṿe-deʻot ṿe-tsoraf la-hen Sefer Minḥat ḳenaʼot le-R. Aba Mari de-Lunil [Haḳdamah-pereḳ 37] -- Ḥeleḳ Rishon, kerekh 2. Miḳra Midrash ṿe-deʻot Teshuvot ha-shayakhot le-Miḳra Midrash ṿe-deʻot ṿe-tsoraf la-hen Sefer Minḥat ḳenaʼot le-R. Aba Mari de-Lunil [pereḳ 38-pereḳ 127] -- Ḥeleḳ sheni. Teshuvot ha-shayakhot le-Masekhet Berakhot ṿe-Seder Zeraʻim -- Ḥeleḳ shelishi. Teshuvot ha-shayakhot le-Masekhet Shabat ṿe-ʻEruvin.

When Sadi Carnot carried out the pioneering work on heat engines which led to the second law of thermodynamics, he contemplated an ideal heat engine, one that was completely reversible. Carnot's use of idealization was particularly successful ‐ while the ideal engine cannot actually be constructed, the conclusions he derived for the ideal engine hold a fortiori for actual heat engines. For example, the greater the temperature difference between the two heat reservoirs, the higher the engine's efficiency. But this is (...) not always the case. What holds true in the ideal limit may be false in reality. Nevertheless, the ideal case, simple and tractable, can be expected to shed light on actual cases, the precise treatment of which is impossible or impractical. Idealizations abound in science: ideal gases, closed systems, perfectly rational agents, and evolutionarily stable strategies. Indeed, thinkers as diverse in their outlook as Edmund Husserl and Albert Einstein have pointed to idealizations as the hallmark of modern science. (shrink)

This paper offers an interpretation of Poincaré's conventionalism, distinguishing it from the Duhem–Quine thesis, on the one hand, and, on the other, from the logical positivist understanding of conventionalism as a general account of necessary truth. It also confronts Poincaré's conventionalism with some counter-arguments that have been influential: Einstein's (general) relativistic argument, and the linguistic rejoinders of Quine and Davidson. In the first section, the distinct roles played by the inter-translatability of different geometries, the inaccessibility of space to direct observation, (...) and general holistic considerations are identified. Together, they form a constructive argument for conventionalism that underscores the impact of fact on convention. The second section traces Poincaré's influence on the general theory of relativity and Einstein's ensuing ambivalence toward Poincaré. Lastly, it is argued that neither Quine nor Davidson has met the conventionalist challenge. (shrink)

Using state-of-the-art observational datasets and results from a large archive of computer model simulations, a consortium of scientists from 12 different institutions has resolved a long-standing conundrum in climate science—the apparent discrepancy between simulated and observed temperature trends in the tropics. Research published by this group indicates that there is no fundamental discrepancy between modeled and observed tropical temperature trends when one accounts for: the uncertainties in observations; and the statistical uncertainties in estimating trends from observations. These results refute a (...) recent claim that model and observed tropical temperature trends “disagree to a statistically significant extent”. This claim was based on the application of a flawed statistical test and the use of older observational datasets. (shrink)

1. ʻAmud Torah. ʻAmud ʻavodah, ḥ. 1 -- 2. ʻAmud ʻavodah, ḥ. 2. ʻAmud gemilut ḥasadim.

Poincaré’s conventionalism has thoroughly transformed both the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mathematics. In the former it gave rise to new insights into the complexities of scientific method, in the latter to a new account of the nature of (so-called) necessary truth. Not only proponents of conventionalism, such as the logical positivists, were influenced by Poincaré, but also outspoken critics of conventionalism, such as Quine, Putnam, and (as I will argue) Wittgenstein, were deeply inspired by conventionalist ideas. Indeed, (...) during the twentieth century, most philosophers of science and mathematics engaged in dialogue with conventionalism. As is often the case with complex ideas, there is no consensus about the meaning of conventionalism in general and Poincaré’s original version of it in particular. Nonetheless, notions such as underdetermination (of theory), empirical equivalence (of incompatible theories), implicit definition, holism, and conceptual relativity, all of which can be linked to Poincaré’s writings, have become central to philosophy. In tracing the flow of Poincaré’s ideas through the philosophical space of the twentieth century, this article emphasizes not only the stimulus provided by his actual views but also the effects of misreading and unjustified appropriation. (shrink)